

About Heidegger's call of conscience

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By Heidegger the conscience is conceived as a call (Ruf). This is framed within the question about a being-a-whole¹ (Ganzsein). If the Dasein (human being), conceived in the I Section of *Sein und Zeit, Being and time* (in the following 'Bat') was understood especially as the Dasein *between* birth and death, within the *Existential Analytic* being and time have stayed out.

What refers to the relationship from Dasein to death will lead to the conception of Dasein as *being-toward-death* and Heidegger will achieve to give a great strength to the traditional *memento mori*, that independent from religion, has been thematized in the western philosophy since Socrates.

What concerns to the relationship of Dasein with birth will lead to the conception of *historicity* (*Geschichtlichkeit*), which is understood in the way of "occurrence" (*Geschehen*) of Dasein.

But the decisive point about the possibility of the *being-a-whole* that corresponds to an extreme form of the being-one's-self (Selbstsein) of Dasein is in relationship with the possibility of a genuine action. Therefore, we can say that the development of the II Section of 'Bat' is in the direction to this possibility. The entrance to action is given by the *resoluteness* (*Entschlossenheit*), that above all, is *resoluteness toward being-one's-self*. And this *resoluteness* is also the previous step toward the final *decision* (*Entscheidung*) to act in a certain way.

So by contemplating *Sein und Zeit* as a whole we can clearly notice that if from the beginning the main thing is certainly the question about being, and at the same time how this question determines the essence of Dasein, in the central part of the II Section the concern is how Dasein has to act.

But Dasein exists mostly in the *forgetfulness* of being in its *everydayness* (*Alltäglichkeit*), whereas it is also *alienated* (*entfremdet*) of its own being, and therefore in this *everydayness* it is not him-self. This is the reason why for Heidegger the first thing is to look for an *attestation* (*Bezeugung*) about the possibility of *being-one's-self*. Quote:

"We are looking for a potentiality-of-being of Dasein that is attested by Dasein itself in its existential possibility" (Par. 54, 267), "Gesucht ist ein eigentliches Seinkönnen des Daseins, das von diesem selbst in seiner existentiellen Möglichkeit bezeugt wird".

And *conscience* (*Gewissen*) has primarily to do with this possible attestation of the self-being. This suggests us a lot, because it means that Heidegger searches for a field, a place where we can undoubtedly find the possibility of *being-one's-self*, and he finds it in this very special phenomenon of the conscience. If it wasn't so, when

¹ Heidegger, *Being and time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, 1996.

we talk about self-being, we would be talking either about non-sense, or about nothing. But, on the contrary, here we have a phenomenon in us, which attests about this possibility.

Nevertheless we are not *initially and for the most part (zunächst und zumeist)* one-self, and therefore the call, in the form of *the summons (Anruf)* is directed to the *they (das Man)*, and more precise, to the *they-self*, because this means the way how the general *they* (the others, everybody, but at the same time no one in particular) incarnates, realizes in each individual.

I will avoid to refer myself to the very doubtful translation in english of this last term: *the they (das Man)*. By the way, the translation of Bat of Joan Stambaugh is not precisely a well achieved translation. We find in this translation, together with well translated words and sentences, in general, also great difficulties, for instance, as we will see, the wrong translation, at one place at least, as *they self*, instead of *one's self*. Anyhow, my own interest in considering this translation, lays in the reason that it is the last one, 1996, in english.

Perhaps the problem for the english language is that it has not a clear impersonal pronomen, and if it is, the "it" (it happens, it goes, it functions), normally it has a meaning which is too concrete and objective, and so it doesn't fit to the Dasein and its way of being. From the other side, our translator, Stambaugh, has not difficulties at all in their translation of the 'Selbstsein' as 'being-itself', although the most part of the time it is translated as 'being-one's-self'. And since we mention this *one's-self*, this could have been, on the contrary, a solution for the translation of the 'Man' as the 'one'. So it was in the spanish translation in the sixties of José Gaos; and for his part, the 'Man-selbst' as 'one's-self', in comparison with that, the authentic *self* could then be simply 'self-being', 'Selbstsein'. But I'm aware that in english as in spanish, and indeed in other languages, what we normally mean through the expression 'one's-self' points at an authentic *one*).

Let's go on and leave aside this very complicated problems of translation, that sometimes interrupt the thinking. All and all, translation is philosophically very interesting, from the moment that has to do with the possibility of transcending our own language, and this enables us to have the experience to name the things for the first time, from the moment that we have to say something in another language. But now, as I said, we must go on.

The *summons* (this very juridictional translation of 'Anruf') is directed to the Dasein lost in the *everydayness* and under the power of the *they-self*, and this power is indeed so strong that even the *itself of Dasein (Selbst)*, following the end of Par. 27, is an existentiell modification of the *they*: I quote:

"*Authentic being one's self* is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, a state detached from the they, *but it is an existentiell modification of the they* as an essential existential" (Bat, p. 130).

So, if we are called to our *being one's self* we have to take account that we achieve only a momentaneous modification of the *they*. It also happens that we are trapped in the *public interpretedness (öffentliche Ausgelegtheit)* of the *they*, which speaks in the way of the *idle talk (Gerede)*. This is the reason why the *summons* points direct at the *they-self*, *passing over (Übergehen)* it at the same time, without listening or considering it. This is the only way to revert the situation of *lostness (Verlorenheit)*, in which we *find ourselves (sich befinden)*. Heidegger:

“What is what is talked about in the call of conscience, what is summoned? Evidently Da-sein itself”,
and then continues:

“And to what is one summoned? To one’s *own self*. No to what Dasein is, can do, and takes care of in everyday being-with-one-another, not even to what has moved it, what it has pledged itself to, what it has let itself be involved with. Da-sein is *passed over in this call*. The call to the self does not take the slightest notice of all this. Because only the *self* of the they-self is summoned and made to hear, the *they* collapses. The fact that the call passes over both the they and the public interpredness of Dasein by no means signifies that it has also not been *reached*. Precisely in *passing over* the they, the call pushed it (adamant as it is about public recognition) into insignificance. But, robbed of its refuge and this subterfuge by the summons, the self is brought to itself by the call” (Bat, p. 273).

The call as *summons*, whose direction is *the they-self*, to which it points at, is not sufficient; in this way it would not accomplish nothing at all. Therefore the call is also summons to the *being one’s self*. Let’s hear about this:

“We must remember that when we designate conscience as a call, this call is summons to the they-self in its self. As this summons, it is the summons of the self to its potentiality-of-being-a-self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities” (Bat, p. 274).

We have to interrupt our analysis, because we find here again some problems with the translation. Terminologically Heidegger makes a clear distinction between two modes of the call: ‘Anruf’, the ‘summons’ and ‘Aufruf’, and Stambaugh uses practically the same word for it, and adding a all explanation, like “summons of the self to its potentiality-of-being-a-self”. In this way the reader loses the meaning of the text. By the spanish translation, which appeared in 1997, of the chilean philosopher Jorge Eduardo Rivera, that in general is better than the former of the spanish José Gaos, though he uses for ‘Aufruf’ a very adequate word – ‘intimación’ –, he forgets frequently this word and translates only with ‘call’.

If ‘Aufruf’ is like a sort of ‘invocation’, with the call we have then a double movement: *summons* to the *they-self* and invocation to the *one’s self*.

And still, if the call of conscience passes over the *idle talk* of the *they-self*, in Heidegger’s conception of conscience, other than in the one of Kant, there is here no discussion, no negotiation, no trial, indeed there is nothing to talk about. In this sense we are not here in front of a court or tribunal at all. Cite:

“But are we to define what is spoken in this discourse? What does conscience call to the one summoned? Strictly speaking – nothing. The call does not say anything, does not give any information about events of the world, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it strive to open a “conversation with itself” in the self which has been summoned. “Nothing” is called *to* the self which is summoned, but it is *summoned* to itself, that is, to its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In accordance with its tendency as call, the call does not mandate a “trial” for the self which has been summoned, but as a summons to the ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self, it calls Dasein forth (ahead-of-itself) to its most unique possibilities” (Bat, p. 273).

For sure this is one of the main issues by Heidegger’s conception of conscience. Likewise his thinking, that means a profound turn in the history of philosophy, we notice also very clearly a turning point in the history of conscience. This goes so far

that we are here in front of a conception that not only contradicts all history, but also the way of understanding conscience in our common world. We experience the phenomenon of conscience as discussion, conflict, doubt, hesitation, during long times, and we have seen why this, in the perspective of Nietzsche's conception of conscience, or better of bad conscience, is very manifest. So with Heidegger all this disappears.

In this regard we have to say that this conscience, so understood, is perhaps at the end not in contact with our everyday world, or at least in the way how we normally perceive it. We experience conscience as having to do with the real problems of the people. But it is also an indiscutable fact that our conscience in the *everydayness* can be manipulated by the *they*. If we take a look around the most questions about very important problems of our world, like abortion, the way we handle with the treatment of aids, with the so called bird-flue, with the acceptance of soft drugs, with the nuclear energy, and the environment, all these problems give very clearly to understand, that at the end we solve them almost blind and the decision taken can be this one or the contrary. Again we have to remember here with Goethe that man acts without conscience, and on the ground of the interpretation of Jaspers about this sentence, this has to do with our essential finitude as human beings.

It is evident that Heidegger sees this situation. For instance in *What is thinking?* he sustains that our "one-way of thinking" ("eingleisiges Denken") drives us from war after war, whereas peace means at the end only the preparation of war. With this expression he seems to have in mind the work of Von Clausewitz, who says that diplomacy is the continuation of war with other means. And because of this situation (that we can describe as manipulation of conscience, of getting into a negotiation or a trial), in the perspective of Heidegger, conscience passes over the *idle talk* of the *they*.

Here like in other sights of Heidegger's thinking we can recognize some spiritual bond with the eastern philosophy, what he himself recognizes in other contexts. And this nearness to the eastern philosophy is also notable in what would be the utmost of this conception: conscience by Heidegger doesn't speak at all and she expresses herself in the way of silence:

"The call is lacking any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet it is not at all obscure and indefinite. *Conscience speaks only and constantly in the mode of silence*. Thus it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces Da-sein thus summoned and called upon to the reticence of itself. The fact that what is called in the call is lacking a formulation in words does not shunt this phenomenon into the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but only indicates that the understanding of "what is called" may not cling to the expectation of a communication of any such thing" (Bat, p. 273-274).

Indeed *Gewissen*, we have to say, by Heidegger, as it was for Kant and Thomas Aquin is infalible. If there are errors in listening to the silent voice of the conscience, these are generated because of the power of the interpretedness of the *they*. I may quote about this:

"What the call discloses is nevertheless unequivocal, even if it gets interpreted in different ways in individual Da-sein in accordance with its possibilities of being understood. Whereas the content of the call is seemingly indefinite, the direction it

takes is a sure one and is not to be overlooked. The call does not need to search gropingly for someone to be summoned, nor does it need a sign showing whether it is he who is meant or not. "Deceptions" occur in conscience not by an oversight of the call (a mis-calling) but only because the call is *heard* in such a way that, instead of being understood authentically, it is drawn by the they-self into a manipulative conversation with one's self and is distorted in its character of disclosure" (Bat, p. 274).

Again we have to stop here, because of two errors by the translation: one simple and the other serious; at first, one cursive has been forgotten, for the word 'direction' ('*Einschlagsrichtung*'); the other error is about the end of the cite, by the statement: "it is drawn by the they-self into a manipulative conversation with one's self", which is in German: "vom Man-selbst in ein verhandelndes Selbstgespräch gezogen wird". As we clearly see, it is not the *one's self*, which draws in a manipulative conversation, but the *they-self*.

Another important issue can be put under the question: who calls in the conscience? As possible answers, and thinking in a large tradition, we can say that the one who calls is God, the man himself, or the being. This is also the question about that "Other" that speaks in our conscience, since Socrates' *daimon*. Certainly it can be also one self (but not the *one's self*) who calls and silently speaks, in the way of *giving to understand (zu verstehen geben)*, but this also in the meaning of "something other in us". By Heidegger we can find principally two answers to this question, but finally, there is only one: the two different answers would be: Dasein and the being are the ones that call in our conscience. But, as already pointed out, because of the ontocentric understanding of Dasein, finally it is the being who calls. The clew expression here is: "it calls". Heidegger says simply: "The call comes *from us*, but *over us*". Let's listen to the place where this is developed, by trying to make my own translation of it:

"The call is not and is never planned by ourselves, or prepared, or 'voluntarily realized'. "It" calls, against expectative or will. From the other side, the call comes undoubtedly not from someone else, that is with us in the world. The call comes *from us*, but *over us*" (Bat, p. 275).

This is most relevant also, for the reason that this call coming "*from us*, but *over us*" is without any consideration of one's personal, social, economical, political, cultural position or situation. Status, blood, soil, race, belief, ideology, and so on have not any relevance at all for the call. The call is without name and therefore it has to be an absolute "Other", that is the being, that calls in us.

Resumen de Diccionario de la traducción de
Being and time, de Joan Stambaugh,
State University of New York Press, 1996

Absorption (Aufgehen)
Ahead of itself (sich-vorweg)
Alienation (Entfremdung)
Anticipation of death (Vorlaufen zum Tode)
As-structure (Als-Struktur)
Association (Umgang)
Attestation (Bezeugung)
Attunement (Befindlichkeit, Gestimmtheit)
Authentic (eigentlich)
Authenticity (Eingentlichkeit)
Average, averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit)
Being and becoming (Sein und Werden)
Being and seeming (Sein und Schein)
Being as such (Sein als solches)

Being in general (Sein überhaupt)
Being of beings (Sein des Seiendes)
Being against one another (Widereinandersein)
Being alone (Alleinsein)
Being already (Schon sein)
Being-already-together-with (Schon-sein-bei)
Being-already-in (Schon-sein-in)
Being-among-one-another (Untereinandersein)
Being as it is (Sosein)
Being for one another (Füreinandersein)
Being-in (In-sein)
Being 'in' one another ("In" einandersein)
Being in-on-it (Mit-dabei-sein)
Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein)
Being-on-the-scent (Auf-der-Spur-sein)
Being-one's-self, being-its-self (Selbstsein)
Being-out-for (Aussein auf)
Being together with (Sein bei)
Being toward (Sein zu)
Being-with (Mitsein)
Beyond itself (über sich hinaus)
Call of conscience (Gewissensruf)
Care (Sorge)
Choice (Wahl)
Circumspection, circumspect (Umsicht, umsichtig)
Clearing (Lichtung, lichten)
Close of (verschliessen)
Co-aттunement (Mitbefindlichkeit)
Coming toward (zukommen, Zu-kunft)

Conceal, hide (verbergen)
Concealment (Verborgenheit)
Close off (verschliessen)
Cover up (verdecken)
Concern, solicitude (Fürsorge)
Concerned about (es geht um)
Considerateness, regard (Rücksicht)
Conspicuousness (Auffallen)
Constant, constancy (Ständigkeit, Beständigkeit)
Curiosity (Neugier)
Dasein (being-there)
Deception, delusion (Täuschung)
De-distancing (Entfernung)
Deficient (defizient)
Deformalize (Entformalisieren)
Delivered over, entrusted (überantwortet)
Demise (Ableben)

Depersonalization (Entpersonalisierung)
De-presentifying (Entgegenwärtigung)
Despair (Verzweiflung)
Destiny (Geschick)
Destructuring (Destruktion)
Detrimentality, harmfulness (Abträglichkeit)
De-worlding (Entweltlichung)
Directing oneself toward, being directed toward (Sichrichten auf)
Directionality (Ausrichtung)
Disavowal (Widerruf)
Disclosure (Erschliessen)
Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
Discourse (Rede)
Discover(y), uncover(ing) (entdecken, Entdeckung)
Discoveredness (Entdecktheit)
Distance (Abstand)
Distantiality (Abständigkeit)
Distortion, disguise (verstellen, Verstelltheit)
Drive (Trieb)
Dumb, mute (stumm)
Dwelling (Aufenthalt, sich aufhalten)
Ecstasy (Ekstase)
Ecstatic (ekstatisch)
Ek-sistence (Ek-sistenz)
Emphathy (Einfühlung)
Encountering (Begegnen)
Enigma (Rätsel)
Entlagement, falling prey (Verfallen)
Envisage (vergegenwärtigen)
Equanimity (Gleichmut)
Equiprimordial(ity) (Gleichursprünglichkeit)
Estimating (schätzen)
Ethics (Ethik)
Eudaemonism (Eudaimonismus)
Event (Ereignis)
Everydayness (Alltäglichkeit)
Everyone (Jedermann)
Everywhere and nowhere (überall und nirgends)
Existential (Existenzial)
Existentiell (Existenziell)
Existential analytic (existenziale Analytik)
Expecting (erwarten)
Experience (Erlebnis)
External world (Aussenwelt)
Facticity (Faktizität)
Factual (tatsächlich)
Factuality (Tatsächlichkeit)

Falling prey, entanglement (Verfallen)
Familiarity (Vertrautheit)

Farness, distance (Ferne)

Fate (Schicksal)
Fear (Furcht)
Feeling (Gefühl)

Find oneself (sich finden, sich befinden)

Finiteness, finitude (Endlichkeit)
Flight (Flucht)

For-the-sake-of-which (das Worumwillen)
For-one-another (Füreinander)
Fore-conception (Vorgriff)
Fore-having (Vorhabe)
Fore-sight (Vorsicht)
Fore-structure (Vor-Struktur)

Forget (vergessen)

Forgottenness (Vergessenheit)

Formal indication (formale Anzeige)
Formalizing (formalisieren)

Found (fundieren)

Foundations (Fundamente)

Free (freigeben)

Free-floating (freischwebend)

Fullfillment (Erfüllung)

Fundamental analysis (Fundamentalanalyse)

Future, futural (Zukunft, zukünftig)

Genuine (echt, genuin)
Genus (Gattung)

Give to understand (zu verstehen geben)

Given(ness) (Gegebenheit, Gebung)

Ground (gründen, begründen)

Ground, noun (Grund)

Groundless (bodenlos)

Guilt, guilty (Schuld, schuldig)

Hand down, over; tradition (Überlieferung)

Handiness (Zuhandenheit)

Have been, having-been (Gewesenheit)

Have to be (zu sein haben)
Hearsay (Hörensagen)

Heedful, taking care (besorgendes)

Heedfulness, taking care (Besorgen)
Heritage (Erbe)

Historicality (Historizität)

Historicism (Historismus)

Historicity (Geschichtlichkeit)

Historiography (Historie)
History (Geschichte)

Horizon (Horizont)
I, the (das Ich)
Idle talk (Gerede)
Illusion, semblance (Schein)
Immanent (immanent)
Imminent (bevorstehend)
In itself (an sich, an ihm selbst)
In-order-to (das Um-zu)
Inauthentic (uneigentlich)
Indebtedness (Verschuldung)
Indefiniteness (Unbestimmtheit)
Indeterminate inmediate (unbestimmtes Unmittelbare)
Indifference (Gleichgültigkeit)
Indifference (Indifferenz)
Individualize, individuate (vereinzeln)
Infinite (unendlich)
Initially and for the most part (zunächst und zumeist)
Inner, inward (inner, innerlich)
Innerworldly (innerweltlich)
Insideness (Inwendigkeit)
Insignificance (Unbedeutsamkeit)
Intelligibility, comprehensibility (Verständlichkeit)
Intend (intendieren)
Interpretedness (Ausgelegtheit)
Irrresoluteness (Unentschlossenheit)
„Just looking“ (Nur-noch-hinsehen)
Lack (Mangel)
Lay open (aufschliessen)
Leeway (Spielraum)
Leaping (Springen)
Letting be (sein lassen)
Levelling (Nivelierung)
Liberate (befreien)
Limit-situation, borderline (Grenzsituation)
Listening (Hören auf, zuhören, hörig sein)
Location, locus, place (Ort)
Looking (hinsehen)
Lostness, being-lost (Verlorenheit, Verlorensein)
Loyalty (Treue)
Making present (Gegenwärtigen)
Making room (Einräumen)
Man, human being (Mensch)
Manifestness (Offenbarkeit)
Meaning (Sinn)
Measurement (Mass, messen)
Mineness, always-being-mine (Jemeinigkeit, je meines)
Mit-dasein (co-existence)

Modes (Modi, Seinsmodi)
Moment (Augenblick)
Mood (Stimmung)
Most extreme (äusserst)
Motion (Bewegung)
Movement (Bewegtheit)
Multiplicity (Mannigfaltigkeit)
Nearest/farthest (nächste/fernste)
Nearness (Nähe)
New, the (das Neue)
Nobody, no one (Niemand)
Nonbeing (Nichtsein)
Not, the (das Nicht, Nichtheit)
Not-to-be-bypassed (unüberholbar)
Not yet (noch nicht)
Nothing(ness) (das Nichts)
Nowhere (nirgends)
Nullity (Nichtigkeit)
Numbed, benumbed (benommen)
Number (Zahl)
Object Objekt, Gegenstand)
Objectivation (Objektivierung)
Objective, objectivity (Sachlichkeit)
Objective presence (Vorhandenheit)
Obstinacy (Aufsässigkeit)
Obtrusiveness Aufdringlichkeit)
Obviousness, Self-evidence (Selbstverständlichkeit)
Ocurrence (Geschehen)
Ontic (ontisch)
Ontological (ontologisch)
Open(ing) (offen, öffnen)
Openness (Offenheit)
Origin (Ursprung)
Orinary (originär)
Other(s), the (der Andere)
Other-worldly, the (das Jenseits)
Outside (ausser, Aussen)
Outstanding (Ausstand, ausstehen)
Owe (schulden)
Pass away (Vergehen)
Past (Vergangenheit)
Perceiving (vernehmen, wahrnehmen)
Perish (verenden)
Persistence (Beharrlichkeit)
Phenomenal (phänomenal)
Phenomenon (Phänomen)
Place (Platz, platzieren)

Plunge (Sturz)
Poetry (Dichtung)
Point out (Aufzeigung)
Position (Stelle, Stand, Lage)
Positive (positiv)
Possible, the (das Mögliche)
Potentiality of being (Seinkönnen)
Power (Kraft, Macht)
Pre (vor)
Predicate, predication (Prädikat(ion))
Predilection (Hang)
Prefiguration, prescription (Vorzeichnung)
Presence (Anwesenheit)
Presencing (Anwesen)
Preservation (Verwahrung)
Presupposition (Voraussetzung)
Primordial (ursprünglich)
Primordiality (Ursprünglichkeit)
Priority (Vorrang)
Privation, privative (Privation, privativ)
Project(ing) (Entwurf, entwerfen)
Property (Eigenschaft)
Provenance (Herkunft)
Public, publicness (öffentlich, Öffentlichkeit)
Question of, the meaning of being (Seinsfrage, Frage nach dem Sinn vom Sein)
Rapture (Entrückung)
Reckon (rechnen)
Reference, referential (Verweisung)
Reification (Vedinglichung)
Relevance (Bewandtnis)
Remembering (Erinnerung)
Remotness, remove (Entferntheit)
Resolutness (Entschlossenheit)
Resolution (Entschluss)
Responsible (schuldig, Schuldhaben)
Reticence (Verschwiegenheit)
Retrieve, repetition (Wiederholung)
Reveal (enthüllen)
Rootedness (Verwurzelung)
Schema, scheme (Schema)
Schematism (Schematismus)
Scholasticism (Scholastik)
Seeing (sehen)
Self, the (das Selbst)
Selfness (Selbstheit)
Selfsameness (Selbigkeit)

Sensing (empfinden)
 Serviceability (Dienlichkeit)
Showing itself, self-showing (Sichzeigen)
 Shrinking back (zurückweichen)
Sight (Sicht)
Sighting (sichten)
Significance (Bedeutsamkeit)
Signify, signification (bedeuten, Bedeutsamkeit)
Silence, keeping silent (Schweigen)
Source (Quelle)
Space, spatial (Raum, räumlich)
Spatiality (Räumlichkeit)
Stanpoint (Standpunkt)
Statement, proposition (Aussage, Satz)
 Staying, lingering (Verweilen)
 Steadfastness (Standfestigkeit)
 Steadiness (Stätigkeit)
 Stream (Strom, Fluss)
Stretch (Strecke)
 Stretching along (Erstrecktheit, Erstreckung)
 Submission of, dependence (Angewiesenheit auf)
 Subsist, subsistence (Bestehen, Bestand)
 Succession (Folge, Abfolge)
Summons (Anruf, Aufruf -?-)
Surrounding world (Um welt)
Taking care (Besorgen)
„That it is...and has to be“ (Das es ist....und zu sein hat
 Thematization (Thematizierung)
There, the (das Da)
“There is” (“es gibt)
They, the (das Man)
They-self (Man-selbst)
Thing, thingliness (Ding, Dinglichkeit)
Things at hand (Zahandene)
 Things themselves (die Sachen selbst)
 This-wordly, the (Das Diesseits)
Thrown, twrownness (Geworfenheit)
To-be (Zu-sein)
 Tolerance (Nachsicht)
 Tool (Werkzeug)
 Totality, the whole (Ganzheit, Das Ganze).
 Tradition(al) (Tradition(ell))
 Tranquilization (Beruhigung)
 Transmit (übergangen).
Transparency (Durchsichtigkeit)
Uncanny (unheimlich)
Unconcealment (Unverborgenheit)

Underway (unterwegs)

Untruth (Un wahrheit)

Upon-which, the (das Woraufhin)

Uprooting (Entwurzlung)

Urge (Drang)

Usability (Verwendbarkeit)

Use (verwenden)

Useful thing (Zeug)

Using (verwenden, verbrauchen)

Validity (Geltung)

Veil, conceal (verhüllen)

Voice (Stimme)

Way to be (Weise zu sein)

Whence, the (das Woher)

Whiter, the (das Wohin)

Whole, the (das Ganze)

Wholeness (Gänze)

Willing (wollen)

With-world (Mitwelt)

Within timeness (Innerzeitigkeit)

Work-world (Werkwelt)

Worldiness (Weltlichkeit)

Worldless (weltlos)